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Abstract 
 
China has yet to import the corporate governance “canon” (generally accepted rules as promoting 
share holder value as well as minority shareholder and other stakeholders’ rights) into its Code of 
Corporate Governance. What effect would Chinese companies’ simply adopting such a canon – 
as defined by Hong Kong or other foreign corporate governance practices -- have on their share 
prices? We look at Mainland Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong, looking at the way their 
share prices react to economic fluctuations when they have better or worse corporate governance 
practices. Using a differences-of-differences methodology, that such share prices could/would 
increase by around 7% -- increasing profits by about $330 billion. Yet, a significant part of the 
distribution of these companies loose money in the short-run. These results provide yet another 
confirmation that adopting the corporate governance canon can profit companies’ investors, but 
not all of them.    
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The Value of the Corporate Governance Canon on Chinese Companies  
Bryane Michael, University of Hong Kong and  
Say Goo, University of Hong Kong 
 
Introduction 
 
Why would a corporate manager not want to improve his or her company’s corporate governance? 
For decades, a “canon” of corporate governance reforms, epitomised by the OECD (2015) 
Principles of Corporate Governance, has dominated thinking about the most value-adding ways 
to improve corporate governance. Follow these rules and shareholder value will grow. But does it? 
Especially in emerging markets like China? For decades, scholars like Bai et al. (2004) have tried 
to quantify the gains from “better” corporate governance in China (with better in quotes because 
most academics can not agree on what better means in the Chinese context). Yet, using their 
revenues, profits, or even local stock markets as a gauge of such value suffers from noise like 
economic slow-downs, individuals’ policies, and so forth. What if we look at the data available, 
both from fancy mathematically driven models and from a raw view of the data...from a 
controlled, calm place like Hong Kong? Would Mainland companies, with better corporate 
governance practices, share valuations change differently than those companies with practices 
that do not follow the OECD canon? What about companies implementing reforms broader than 
the canon? 
 
We find that Chinese companies adopting the corporate governance canon – as measured by 
compliance with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s Code of Corporate Governance – earn 7% 
higher returns than those that do not. Such a policy change could increase shareholder value by 
more than $330 billion. The first part of this paper reviews previous works, most finding that 
better corporate governance pays-off in terms of share holder returns. The second part looks at 
the effect on Chinese companies’ valuations when they “import” foreign corporate governance 
rules by listing abroad. These studies generally find that such an import correlates with higher 
share prices. The third part provides yet another confirmation – using a differences-in-differences 
methodology to estimate the value of the canon. Namely, using Mainland firms listed in China as 
a baseline, we look at the effects of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s Code of Corporate 
Governance on Mainland firms listed in Hong Kong from 2009 to 2012. The final section 
concludes.  
 
We should highlight some caveats before we begin. First, we spend more time reviewing other 
studies in-depth in order to provide the reason with the intuitions needed for understanding our 
own results. We do not provide a perfunctory literature review, getting it out of the way in order 
to move on to the good stuff. Our review of past studies represents the good stuff that readers will 
need to form deeper intuitions driving our own results. Second, and similarly, our multi-
disciplinary paper does not follow the usual path of model building and using the econometric 
methods in vogue at the time. We purposely keep our analysis descriptive – following the critical 
school’s criticism in the social sciences that heavy econometrics molds the results and obscures 
the results (Zachariadis and co-authors, 2010; Izurieta, 2017). We do not follow the usual mould 
of publishable papers. We hope the reader finds this approach a useful example of post-crisis 
economics. Third, and again consistent with this approach, we do not try to analyse our mean or 
distribution using fancy econometric tools. Because the evidence about whether corporate 
governance positively or negatively affects share prices remains so murky, even a simple, robust 
 3
conclusion like ours contributes to the din. Simply put, we can not believe no one has done this 
kind of differences-in-differences before.  
 
Reviewing the Link between Chinese Corporate Governance and Investor Returns 
 
How do we know that ‘better’ corporate governance practices among Chinese firms contribute to 
higher corporate returns? Figure 1 shows the results of simplistic (and wrong) analysis showing 
the simple correlation between corporate governance scores and corporate returns. Companies 
with corporate governance practices conforming to the OECD’s ‘corpus’ of good practices earn 
higher schools. Foreign companies with the highest corporate governance scores have rates of 
return just as low as low-scoring Chinese state owed enterprises. Such work supports other 
findings from academics like Cheung and co-authors’ (2008) early econometric work. Their 
econometric analysis finds no relationship between corporate governance index scores and 
market valuation. Sector-specific work, such as Fan et al. (2014), looking at corporate 
governance and the performance of Chinese real-estate companies – similarly find little 
relationship. At first glance, then, following the corpus seems to have no effect on public 
investors’ returns.  
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Figure 1: Foreign Companies Lower Governance Standards
when in the Middle Kingdom  
The figure show s corporate governance scores pf Chinese companies by type of enterprise. While having the highest 
scores, foreign companies' corporate governance scores drop w hen in China. Foreign companies' return on equity 
show s that managers of foreign companies may sacrif ice returns for their better governance. Companies of all types 
need to f ind a w ay of governing better w ithout sacrif icing returns. 
Source: Protiviti (2013). 
 
 
Yet, more credible studies do find a relationship between Chinese firms’ corporate governance 
index values market valuations. Even before looking at these studies, Figure 2 shows an 
unmistakable relationship between the quality of Mainland companies’ corporate governance and 
their Tobins’ q.1 The line of best fit seems to show that a one-point increase in corporate 
governance indicators correlates with a 1 point change in Tobin’s q values. Figure 3 shows very 
similar findings – with changes in market valuations (namely Tobin’s q) corresponding to 
changes in Chinese firms’ corporate governance index values. As firms move from the ‘worst’ to 
the ‘best’ corporate governance practices (and we stop putting these subjective judgements in 
quotes), they add the extra value of the replacement cost of their assets. By way of illustrating the 
magnitude of these findings, if all Mainland listed companies moved from worst to best-in-class 
                                                 
1 Tobin’s q measures the extent to which companies’ market valuations exceed the replacement cost of their assets 
(roughly speaking). Its plural is probably Tobin’s qs (as there is only one Tobin). Yet, the text looks cleaner our way.   
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corporate governance, such a move would add about $2.7 trillion in market capitalization to these 
firms (see figure for methodology used to find this number). As Cheung and co-authors (2010) 
show, Mainland firms with better corporate governance list abroad and have higher levels of 
disclosure (and accompanying levels of market value). Cheung and other co-authors (2007) find 
that better Mainland corporate governance correlates to higher market valuations for Mainland 
companies listed in Hong Kong.   
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
low est 2 3 4 highest
corporate  governance  score 
 (5=best)
To
bi
n'
s 
q 
(s
ha
re
 p
ric
e 
pr
em
iu
m
 
ab
ov
e 
re
pl
ac
em
en
t c
os
t)
Figure 3: Better Corporate Governance Rules for Chinese Firms  
Would Add US$2.7 Trillion To Their Market Cap 
The figure show s the estimated level of Tobin's q  corresponding to each corporate governance grade of Chinese 
companies. Moving from the low est to the highest corporate governance grade w ould increase a Chinese 
company's market capitalisation by basically one more company (as one more value of the replacement value of the 
company's assets). The World Bank reports an $8.2 trillion market cap for Chinese f irms in 2015. If the market values 
these f irms w eigh in at three times their asset replacement cost, and if good corporate governance adds another 
replacement cost-value, market values should rise by about $2.7 trillion.
Source:  Based on Bai et al . (2003) methodology and World Bank (2016) for market cap values. 
 
 
Numerous studies show the types of corporate governance relations correlating with higher 
market valuations. Figure 4 shows an example from recent studies looking at the econometric 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. After controlling for other 
variables like market conditions, they find that foreign and institutional ownership, dispersed 
shareholding, effective boards and audit committees, help lift firm values. Most studies confirm 
Bai et al.’s (2004) results – market valuations rise when non-controlling shareholders and 
foreigners hold a large proportion of the company’s shares. Market valuations fall with 
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concentrated shareholdings, when the CEO also acts as the chairperson of the board, and when 
government represents the largest shareholder. Even eye-balling the relationship between Tobin’s 
q and corporate governance indices for individual firms shows the positive relationship in studies 
such as Cheung et al. (2010b). Other authors like Shan and IcIver (2011) find similar evidence 
for non-listed firms – proving that needed reforms span the Chinese corporate sector. 
Interestingly, Lin and co-authors (2009) find that the business environment in which Chinese 
firms compete statistically significantly affects their corporate governance practices. As Chinese 
firms increasingly list and compete in developed markets, corporate governance practices should 
improve.2  
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Independent director ratio
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Institutional shareholding
change in performance for 1 standard deviation in each of the indicators shown
(all values positive)
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Figure 4: Investors Clearly Pay Premiums for Good Corporate Governance in China 
The data show  the relationship betw een several indicators related to Chinese f irms'  corporate governance and their 
performance (as measured by Tobin's q or market premium over book value) and return on assets. The data show  
stronger relationships betw een share price mark-ups and corporate governance (after accounting for factors like these 
f irms' asset sizes, leverage and grow th rates) -- than for returns on assets. Yet, models of Tobin's q  generally have 
low  explanatory pow er (as represented by the tiny R-squared or variance explained).
Source: Lee and Zhang (2011)
Tobin's q  side RoA side
2.5                                .                                0.5
 
 
Better corporate governance (as commonly defined) has other advantages which indirectly 
promote market valuations.3 One way consists of helping to reduce the fraud and the self-dealing 
which makes investors nervous about investing in Mainland shares.4 Examples range from Ming 
Zhao of Puda Coal, ZTE’s circumvention of export restrictions to Iran, and the Bank of China’s 
refusal to turn over customer information in a counterfeiting case (Harris, 2016). Academics have 
quantified the harm such fraud reeks on share prices and demand for Chinese shares.5 More 
specifically, Chen and Zhang (2012) find similarly for the 2002 Chinese Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies’ effect on earnings manipulation. In their econometric study, 
                                                 
2 The ability to draw on different, well-heeled shareholders represents part of this benefit. Epps and Ismail (2009) 
show that, for Chinese firms, returns on assets decline with very concentrated and very dispersed shareholding.  
3 We do not repeat the factors that constitute such good corporate governance – like dispersed shareholding, 
independent directors, etc – to keep our narrative tight. If we must refer to each separate component each time, the 
text becomes far harder to understand and remember.  
4 The investor-blogger circuit – represented by sites like Kreuzroads (2013) and Chinastockfraud.com (2014) -- has 
compiled lists of literally hundreds of recent Chinese stock scams. We cite these sites not to suggest that they provide 
completely reliable information. Yet, the presence of these lists, their popularity and the extent that investors see and 
believe these lists, point to likely harms in investors’ confidence 
5 These harms range from quite a lot to none – with Darrough (2015) representing an example of the first perspective 
and Lee and co-authors (2015) representing the second perspective.  
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they find that the Code curbed earnings management by requiring independent non-executive 
board directors and audit committees staffed with accounting/financial experts. Firth and co-
authors (2011) find that the quality of Chinese corporate governance directly affects the 
“occurrence and detection of financial fraud.” Figure 5 shows the effect that corporate 
governance has on auditor choice – and thus the likelihood of getting away with bad governance 
behaviour. Lo and colleagues (2010) reach similar conclusions – conducting econometric 
analysis on transfer price manipulations. As a result, investors needed larger premia to buy shares 
in companies with poorer corporate governance (Yeh and co-authors, 2009). Thus, better Chinese 
corporate governance indubitably leads to higher share values.  
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The figure show s the various factors corresponding to Chinese companies' choice of a Big 4 auditor rather than a 
local auditor. Supervisory boards clearly breed better corporate governance and concentrated ow nership undermines
it. The authors argue that w eak corporate governance encourages the selection of less skillled auditors, allow ing 
Chinese f irms' ow ners and managers to benefit from "opaqueness gains." All factors show n signif icant at the 5% 
level of "better."
Source: Lin and Liu (2009). 
Not-significant: CEO as Chairman of the Board, Returns on Assets and Firm Risks (proxied by the 
firm's beta).
Figure 5: Certain Chinese Corporate Governance Arrangements Correspond 
with Less Self-Serving Corporate Activity
 
 
What about simply listing on a foreign exchange? Should/can the Mainland import (or bond) 
foreign corporate governance to their domestic operations? Guo and co-authors (2013) show that 
a foreign listing – specifically a Hong Kong listing – can increase the market value of Mainland 
companies by literally hundreds of percentage points. Other data from authors like Klautzer 
(2013) show that openness encourages the corporate governance reform that eventually impacts 
on profits and market valuations. Zhou and co-authors (2011) show that a foreign listing in Hong 
Kong statistically significantly correlates with increases in Mainland firms’ returns on assets, 
board control, and board characteristics conforming to the corporate governance canon.6  Figure 
6 shows the estimated premium for Mainland companies earned by listing in Hong Kong (and 
                                                 
6 Specifically “board characteristics” consists of proxies for the presence of foreign directors, the Board’s 
international experience, the establishment of professional committees, board size, number of boards, proportion of 
independent directors, separation of chairman from general manager, and annual chairman changes. “Board control 
behavior” consists of attendance rates of independent directors, overall board attendance, independent directors’ 
objections, rate of independent directors, performance review of the board, stock incentive mechanisms, the number 
of shareholders at general meetings, the number of extraordinary shareholder meetings, disclosure of business goals/ 
conditions and vision, the implementation of board resolutions, professionalism of committees’ reports, number of 
institutional investors, and the equity ratio of the company’s first major shareholders. See source for more details on 
the construction of these variables.  
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thus theoretically complying with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s Code of Corporate 
Governance. Certain companies -- like Northeast Electric Development, Jilin Chemical In
and Shandong Xinhua Pharma – saw very large increases in their share prem
dustrial, 
ia.  
 
Figure 6: Misleading Examples of Price Premia Earned by Listing in  
Hong Kong Rather than the Mainland 
 
Premium Companies  Premium Companies 
0%-50% ZTE Corp. 
Huaneng Power International 
Huadian Power 
China Southern Airlines 
 
 50%-100% Anhui Expressway 
China Shipping Development 
China Petrol & Chemical Corp.  
Anhui Conch Cement 
 
100%-200% Yanzhou Coal Mining 
Jiangxi Copper 
Shenzhen Expressway 
Tsingtao Brewery  
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochem 
 
 200%-300% Angang New Steel 
Jiangsu Expressway 
Sinopec Yizheng Chemical Fibre 
 
300%-400% Manshan Iron & Steel 
China Eastern Airlines Corp. 
Guangdong Kelon Electrical Holdings 
Guangzhou Pharma 
Guangzhou Shipyard Intl. 
 400%-500%  None 
500%-600% Jiaoda Kunji High-Tech 
Tianjin Capital Environmental 
Protection 
 600%-700% Northeast Electric Development  
Jilin Chemical Industrial  
Jingwei Textile Machinery 
Nanjing Panda Electronic  
Beiren Printing Machinery 
Dongfang Electrical Machinery 
Luoyang Glass 
700%-800% Shandong Xinhua Pharma    
The figure shows the premia for dual-listed shares (on the Hong Kong and Mainland exchanges) for the shares 
shown. The authors argue that a premium on A-shares (listed on the Mainland) represents the ability of insiders to 
extract value from investors. Thus, in Hong Kong as a better market, investors would pay a lower price and expect 
the share price appreciation shown.  
Source: Guo et al. (2007).    
 
In theory, Chinese companies benefiting from adopting  the corporate governance canon cover a 
significant part of the economy. Figure 7 shows the industries more likely to profit – and thus 
import -- good corporate governance standards. If Bris et al.’s (2008) study still reflects the 
current situation among Chinese firms, roughly 11 out of 30 industries can expect to adopt 
market valuation increasing corporate governance practices.7 These eleven sectors appear 
relatively specific (specialised). One might thus hypothesize that managers can adopt profit-
enhancing corporate governance reforms in easily managed sectors only. Yet, corporate 
governance looks particularly pressing for some sectors. The real estate, IT and retail sectors 
affect China’s broader macroeconomic stability and growth.  
 
 
                                                 
7 The situation may not hold, as these sectors might have already adopted all the corporate governance reform they 
can.  
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Figure 7: Sectors Where Importing Corporate Governance Standards Has Affected Tobin’s 
q for Chinese Firms in the Past 
 
Effect No effect  
Construction 
Healthcare 
Steel 
Pharma and biotech 
Media 
Specialty finance 
Mobile telecom 
Tobacco 
Travel/leisure  
Diversified Industrials 
Electronics  
 
Autos 
Beverages 
Electricity, water, gas 
Engineering 
Food and drug retailers 
Food producers 
Forestry & paper 
Household goods 
 
IT 
Leisure goods 
Mining  
Oil and gas 
Personal goods 
Real estate 
Retail 
Software and computer 
Support services 
Water 
The figure shows the industries for which Tobin’s q statistically significantly changed due to differences in 
shareholder protection or accounting standards between China and another jurisdiction from which target firms hail 
during an M&A. The authors argue that importing corporate governance policies and practices causes these changes 
in market valuations.  
Source: Bris et al. (2008) at table 8.  
 
Yet, we do not seem to know why. Few studies find evidence of “bonding” (or Chinese firms 
adopting corporate governance standards when they list and work abroad). Dong and Xue (2009) 
test the extent of such bonding, looking at the extent to which corporate governance related 
variables (like board size, compensation and other factors) statistically significant differ between 
Chinese firms listed in Shanghai/Shenzhen, in Hong Kong or in New York. They find some 
factors, like the salaries of the top three board members, and local demand conditions, and all 
kinds of public disclosure statistically significant differ for firms choosing to list on different 
exchanges (Ibid, Table 3). Yet, factors like board sizes or the proportion of independent directors 
do not differ – putting into doubt the extent of such bonding. Authors like Clarke (2015) write 
even more sceptically about bonding. He argues moreover that whether Chinese firms “bond” to 
foreign corporate governance requirements and values, such rules would not protect investors any 
more than rules at home in China. Consequently, any share price premium paid by investors 
comes from their misplaced belief in the likely success of legal action should these Mainland 
listed companies run into difficulties. Grove and Clouse (2013) might agree – citing Longtop 
Financial Technologies, China MediaExpress, Harbin Electric, China-Biotics and Deer Consumer 
Products as companies delisted in New York for fraud.8 Simply listing on a foreign exchange like 
Hong Kong’s should not, in itself, provide sufficient impetus for improving (importing) better 
corporate governance practices on the Mainland.  
 
Maybe only the indirect effects of better corporate governance rules help improve market 
discipline – and thus owners’/managers’ incentives to maximise shareholder value? We have 
shown above that better corporate governance’s direct effects do not seem to improve shareholder 
value. What about corporate governance’s indirect effects – encouraging transparency and 
                                                 
8 Lee and colleagues (2014) dispute these claims, particularly in relation to Chinese reverse mergers (backdoor 
listings) into the US. They note that even after accounting for fraudulent firms, these companies do better as a group 
than their US peers.  
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disclosure needed for investors to price and trade Chinese firms’ shares accurately?9 If Hong 
Kong’s corporate governance rules reduce information asymmetries between investors and 
insiders, share prices should better reflect such firm-specific information.10 Yet, Figure 8 very 
much casts doubts on the extent to which better corporate governance leads to more informative 
share prices (which reflect firm-specific, rather than general market-related, news). Hong Kong 
share turn-over of Mainland companies does increase, relative to Mainland share turnover for 
cross-listed shares, in response to firm-specific events (news). Yet, adoption of the practices 
usually considered as part of good corporate governance fail to make share prices in Hong Kong 
more responsive to firm-specific news. Such irrelevant factors include institutional ownership, 
independent directors, and even lack of shareholder concentration. Simply listing in Hong Kong 
does not guarantee that Mainland companies receive the benefits of (or discipline from) better 
corporate governance.   
 
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0
Quadratic share concentration*
Return vo latility
Share concentration
Debt to  assets*
Duality
Total assets
H to  A turnover
Extent of firm-specific information in price movements (larger is "better")
Figure 8: Does the Increased Transparency from Supposedly Better Corporate Governance 
Really Make Hong Kong Share Price Movements of Mainland Companies More 
Informative?  
Not significant variables: Percent of shares held by domestic funds, the ratio of H-shares to A-shares, the number 
of QFII investors among the top 10 shareholders, the number of board-level directors, percent of independent non-
executive directors, the number of members of supervisory boards, CEO pay, use of shares to incentivise CEOs, 
Tobin's q , and the number of foreign subsidiaries. 
The f igure show s the extent to w hich each of the factors show n affects the extent to w hich share price changes 
reflect company-specif ic information (commonly know n as a share's synchonicity). We show  the inverse of the 
authors' regression parameter estimates in order to make f irm-specif ic factors score higher in the f igure.  We w orry 
about the large number of factors Typically associated w ith classical corporate governance w hich turn up as 
insignif icant in this study. The authors' application of incorrect econometric techniques most likely explain these 
results. 
Source:  Li et al.  (2014). 
 
 
The recent bout of Mainland company fraud involving foreign listings as well as domestically 
listed firms strongly suggests that foreign listings, and their supposedly stricter corporate 
governance rules, do not lead to better governed Mainland firms.11 Figure 9 shows how fraud has 
                                                 
9 In this context, “accurately” refers to investors’ ability to observe information signalling likely mismanagement, 
self-dealing, and other problems.  
10 As in the previous sentence, we do not explicitly define our terms (in this case “information asymmetry”) as 
managers and owners knowing about their own self-serving, neglect, fraud or even excessive risks which investors 
can not properly value. Without abandoning our scientific precision, we can not accurately describe every concept in 
several sentence. Otherwise, readers would be unable to read such dense and long-winded writing.   
11 We talked above about the effect of fraud in general. We now focus on their effect specifically on foreign listing – 
as the topic of this part of this paper and as a led-in to the next section.  
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significantly reduced market valuations of Mainland shares listed abroad – as reflected in several 
FTSE (2016) indices. Shares of Chinese companies listed on the Mainland (A shares in particular) 
have yielded positive returns since 2011. Yet, a recent correction has shown that these previous 
gains did not reflect knowledge about frauds going on at the time (Yu, 2016). The prices of 
Mainland shares listed and traded in the US – and particularly Singapore -- have seen the largest 
declines.12 High levels of demand in Hong Kong for Chinese shares explain why share prices 
have not fallen as rapidly on the Hong Kong bourse. Fraud contributed to the large sell-off of 
securities in the US – with about 1/3 of all Chinese companies listed in the US had financial 
scandals.13 Indeed, the lower part of Figure 9 shows that the sell-off centred on small cap shares 
(whose companies have the weakest corporate governance) the heaviest. Some Mainland 
companies look toward listing “transfers.” These transfers entail Chinese companies’ delisting in 
the US or other foreign markets in order to relist at home in China (Gu, 2016). Some companies 
probably seek to cash-in on the fraud and run away before news of such fraud catches up with 
their share prices. Others seek to avoid the extra scrutiny. Yet, these companies will not represent 
the bulk which try to maximise profits over the longer term – many by adopting the corporate 
governance canon.  
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Market Caps of Offshore Listed Chinese Companies Dives as Fraud Scandals Multiply
Source: Cogman and Orr (2013)
 
 
                                                 
12 S-shares receive very little analysis in the English language press and among English-language academics. Thus, 
we can not speculate about the reasons for the S-share’s price changes in Singapore. 
13 Beatty and co-authors (2013) provide a superlative account of these frauds as well as related econometric analysis. 
Ang and co-authors provide the 1/3 figure, and other in-depth facts about these frauds.  
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The Effect of “Importing” Corporate Governance Rules 
 
What does the experience of Chinese companies, which have actually improved their corporate 
governance while listed in the US (and other countries), tell us about the corporate governance’s 
effects on profits and returns? Figure 10 shows the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the 
market premia of various types of firms.14 The positive effects on foreign firms seem to exceed 
those of all firms analysed as a single group. Only small foreign firms seem to gain less market 
valuation relative to large foreign firms – an effect we already saw in the case of Mainland 
listings (due to fraud risk). How did particular aspects of these firms’ corporate governance 
influence the excess returns accruing to these firms after the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? 
The figure also shows that, for the whole lot of firms, factors like having an independent 
nominating committee, independent audit committee, having a CEO which does not serve as 
chairperson, low inside share ownership, high institutional share ownership, low audit fees as 
share of total assets, and low market capitalisation all lead to large post-Sarbanes Oxley effects 
on extra (abnormal) returns. Yet, among foreign firms, only the corporate governance factor of 
having an independent nominating committee seemed to boost these excess returns. These results 
thus suggest that corporate governance regulatory reform would likely help even those Chinese 
companies that have not embarked on their own corporate governance reforms.15  
 
                                                 
14 The authors obviously made some mistake in their calculations, as the standard deviations they report for the 
statistically significant results which we cite here exceed the mean values by a factor of 10. We assume the authors 
rescaled the data and forgot to report the rescaling.  
15 This conclusion’s logic is as follows. Having these various corporate governance attributes does not affect the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s effect on excess market returns. Yet, we see that these returns clearly increased for foreign 
firms. Thus, some combination of these reforms contributes to these excess returns (or completely outside factors 
account for these returns).  Yet, coming from different jurisdictions, industries and so forth, these firms do not have 
common factors affecting them which might point to non-corporate governance related effects.  
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Figure 10: US Corporate Governance Related Legislation Fomented 
Excess Returns Among Foreign Companies?
Effect of Corporate governance variables on foreign companies
Significant: independent nominating committee*, independent audit committee, CEO doesn't serve as chairperson, 
inside share ow nership, institutuional share ow nership, audit fees as share of total assets, and market 
capitalisation*. 
Not Significant: board independence, independent compensation committee, discloses off-balance sheet 
information, discloses audit fee information, debt-to-equity ratio, EBIT-to-total assets, and revenue grow th rate.  
* marks signif icant variables for foreign-only sample. 
The f igure show s the estimated returns for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for the types of f irms show n. The bars show  the 
excess return, return above the risk-free rate, differences in returns betw een small and large companies, and 
differences in returns betw een value and grow th stocks/companies. We show  the corporate governance effects the 
authors found for all companies - w ith asterisks denoting signif icant variables for foreign f irms only. 
Source: Sw itzer and Lin (2007) at Table 3 and Table 11. 
 
 
Other data seem to support the view that stronger corporate governance regulations could benefit 
Mainland (and other foreign) firms. Figure 11 shows the gain in abnormal returns and decreased 
delistings for non-US firms listed in the US as a result of the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.16 In summary, the authors find that foreign companies listed in the US most benefited from 
Sarbanes-Oxley when they come from jurisdictions with moderate accounting standards and 
shareholder protection. To put their findings colloquially, foreign firms “bond” (adapt more 
stringent corporate governance policies) when coming from jurisdictions with Goldilocks 
corporate governance -- not too bad and not too good.17 Looking specifically at the way 
Sarbanes-Oxley impacted on company risks, Litvak (2014) finds that a similar Goldilocks 
phenomenon. High risk foreign firms’ risks fell after the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley. However, 
their market valuations also fell. Only large companies from poorer jurisdictions complied with 
the Act – whereas all companies seemed to comply from other jurisdictions. These result thus 
point to a kind of reform momentum, whose history makes clear the reasons and targets of such 
reform (Zhang, 2014). Once Chinese (and other foreign) firms start their corporate governance 
reform, such reform creates the impetus for more reform – facilitating further reforms (Peng and 
Blevins, 2014).  
                                                 
16 Technically, the study looked at these variables before and after the adoption of the Act. We follow the authors’ 
language trying to tie such a correlation to causality.  
17 To take one example, Amoako-Adu and Baulkaran (2007) show how Canadian firms listed in the US lost market 
value de to the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
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Figure 11: China's Accounting and Shareholder Protection Rules Exactly in the Range Where 
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The f igure show s the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on non-US firms' abnormal returns (the left tw o bars) and delistings (on the right). We observe that
Sarbanes-Oxley "harmed" companies from "high quality" jurisdictions (the f igure describes in more detail the exact definition of these terms). Only 
companies from medium "quality" jurisdictions benefitted the most from Sarbanes-Oxley. Could similar rules in Hong Kong have the same result? 
Source: Smith (2005).    
 
Not to belabour the point, but other evidence suggests that adopting the corporate governance 
canon would even help improve corporate governance in the areas these companies are based in 
and work in. Figure 12 shows the relationship between the percent of Chinese companies listing 
abroad from a particular Chinese city or region and the quality of local institutions in that area. 
Just by eye-balling the data, we can see that more companies from places with higher institutional 
quality list abroad more often. Thus these companies can, and do, conform with these foreign 
exchanges’ more stringent corporate governance rules. Yet, within each grouping of places (by 
institutional quality), we see that Chinese firms from places with worse lower institutions 
(relative to similar regions) tend to list abroad more often.18 Such a propensity suggests that 
Mainland firms use foreign listings as a way to import standards needed to compete with peers 
who work in better institutional environments. The canon helps improve the governance 
environment as much “around” the company (in its stakeholder entities) as in the company. 
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Figure 12: Chinese Companies Clearly Use Foreign Listings as a Way to 
Make Up for Poor Local Institutions
The figure show s the relationship betw een the proportion of companies in each Chinese province choosing to 
list in the UK, US or Hong Kong as a percent of those listing in Shanghai or Shenzhen) on the y-axis. The x-axis
show s the quality of local institutions (as World Bank's Doing Business average score at the provincal level). 
Broadly speaking, companies w ith better local institutions prefer to list in high quality regulated exchanges. Yet, 
w ithin the tw o broad groups of provinces, better local institutions can correlate w ith more local listings. 
Thus, after provinces reach a "quanta" of institutional quality, they prefer to compete w ith the big boys. 
The outliers though put this hypothesis into doubt.                  Source: Hornstein (2013) and World Bank (2016).  
 
 
                                                 
18 In order to keep this paper readable, we do not yet again provide the definition of institutions (or institutional 
quality). Readers should see the original study for more details.  
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Regulations requiring greater disclosure not only benefit the companies themselves, but also the 
business environment in which they work.19 Authors like Laurence (2013) find that both 
individual and institutional investors actually do trade on the information disclosed. Chen et al. 
(2014) go further, looking at the extent to which poor disclosure and other corporate governance 
practices correlate with mis-investment (namely under or over investment as assessed by past, 
present and future revenues). As shown in Figure 13, alone, disclosure does not have a 
statistically significant effect on over or under-investment. Yet, disclosure does affect Mainland 
companies’ corporate governance – which in turn affects investment.20 Increased disclosure when 
combined with better corporate governance seems to reduce over-investment – if increasing 
under-investment. Looking at the effects in well-governed Chinese firms shows a total decrease 
in investment inefficiency (namely the extent to which these firms over or under-invest). Market 
characteristics seem to have only microscopic effects on the extent of disclosure. Firms will 
disclose more before attracting external finance and when returns to assets rise. Disclosure 
decreases when market valuations increase and when a firm’s management has more political 
connections.  
 
0.67
0.16
-0.02
-0.19 -0.38 0.018 0.001 -0.004 -0.0060.0
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
disclosure corp gov interact disclosure corp gov* interact* External
f inance
ROA Tobins q Political
connect
re
gr
es
si
on
 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
over-investment
under-investment
investment inefficiency
(whole sample)
investment inefficiency
for strong CG firms
extent of disclosure
Figure 13: Poor Investment Decisions Go Hand in Hand with 
Poor Disclosure and Corporate Governance Practices in China
The figure show s the regression coefficients trying to explain contributions to Mainland firms' under-investment and over-investment decisions. The 
authors f ind that disclosure itself has little effect. Yet, such disclosures combine w ith corporate governance practices to explain such "mis-
investment." Tjhe left most part of the f igure show s the estimates for over-investment (in black) and under-investment (in red). The middle part show s
the effect of these variables on misinvestment (either under or over) for companies strong corporate governance. The right most part of the f igure 
show s the factors correlating w ith more disclosure. The tiny magnitude of these estimates implies very little actual effect.  
Source: Chen et al.  (2015). 
 
 
Stronger Hong Kong rules on disclosure could encourage Mainland firms to engage more 
profitable disclosure. Figure 14 shows the disclosure-producing effects of a foreign listing on 
Mainland firms. Market valuations rise when Mainland companies disclose abroad – presumably 
because foreign investors and stakeholders can act more effectively on these disclosures than 
those inside China. Probabilities of increased disclosure (including voluntary disclosure) jump 
very significantly when these Mainland firms list overseas. For authors like Xi and Yang (2016), 
increased disclosure builds constituencies for further disclosure – as the earnings quality 
improves as well as shareholder/analyst demand for disclosures increase. For authors like Myers 
and Steckman (2014), increased transparency and disclosure serve to make Mainland corporate 
                                                 
19 Choudhury (2016) in particular provides a balanced discussion of the legal issues involved in adopting such 
disclosure rules.  
20 The joint effect (ie interaction) between disclosure and corporate governance yields positive effects on under-
investment and negative effects on over-investment. One interpretation of these data might argue that such disclosure 
seems to cause boards to act more conservatively than otherwise.  
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governance more self-enforcing.  Thus, once such disclosure gains momentum in a place like 
Hong Kong, further transparency looks more likely.   
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Figure 14: Foreign Listings Increase Mainland Firms' Disclosures 
The figure show s the impact of a foreign listing on Chinese f irms' disclosure indices. The f irst tw o bars represent
the regression coeff icients of such disclosure on Tobin's q. The last tw o bars represent the probabilities of increased
disclosure given a foreign listing. We converted these logistic regression coeff icients into probabilities by taking the 
exponent of the logistic equation and dividing the result by 1 plus that result. 
Source: Cheung et al. (2010).  
 
What kinds of gains can Mainland firms expect if they adopt the corporate governance canon (as 
embodied by rules like those required by Hong Kong’s Stock Exchange? If Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
serves as any guide, Mainland firms could lower their capital costs by 0.7% to 1% (Hail and Leuz, 
2008). Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) find that Sarbanes-Oxley did not distort foreigners’ 
incentives to list on foreign markets.21 Instead, worse governed companies had to delist (or face 
the extra compliance costs) – thereby improving market quality and shareholder protection for all 
listed companies.22 Of course, as Wintoki (2007) and Grinstein & Chhaochharia (2007) show, 
not all companies – and especially small firms -- should have the same stringent corpora
governance requirements. Engel et al. (2007), using relatively old data whose conclusions still 
apply to today’s situation, find that companies with more insider (managers’/directors’) 
shareholding delisted much more than those with more dispersed shareholding. They further find 
that the abnormal returns to insider controlled companies which delisted around the time of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s adoption exceeded those of their control group by 6%.
te 
                                                
23 Evidence from 
Belgium shows that the Act had the effect of actually the improving corporate governance of US 
listed overseas companies – by causing decreases in earnings management, and thus likely other 
kinds of accounting manipulation (Dutillieux and Willenkens, 2009). As such, it looks like 
stricter corporate governance rules improve investment returns, even if these policies decrease the 
discretionary influence of insider managers and directors. But we just do not know... and we 
spent 15 pages proving it.  
 
 
 
 
21 Economists care about relative distortions in a market more than the size of the market – as pure changes in size 
only affect marginal incentives (and do not change the distribution of resources or investment decisions. 
22 Hostak and his co-authors (2013) represent one of the many other studies to confirm these findings.  
23 We calculated this statistic by taking the differences-in-differences of pre and post Sarbanes Oxley data and of 
delisters from control group companies (as reported in Table 7).   
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Effects of Corporate Governance Changes on Hong Kong Listed Chinese Firms 
 
What effect would adopting the corporate governance canon – represented by Hong Kong’s 
better corporate governance policies and practices -- have on foreign and particularly Mainland 
firms? Hong Kong-listed Mainland companies’ share price changes might provide some clue. 
The last major revisions to Hong Kong’s code of corporate governance occurred in 2011.24 The 
easiest way of guessing what the effects the revision of Hong Kong’s code of corporate 
governance on Mainland firms had consists of looking at the differences-in-differences of their 
share prices (as described in detail in the Appendix). Namely, we looked at the difference in 
share prices for Mainland firms listed in Hong Kong from January 2011 to December 2012. 
Share prices from for Hong Kong firms listed on the Hong Kong stock market increased on 
average by 20% at a time when Mainland shares on the Hong Kong stock market fell by 11%.25 
The 11% fall in Mainland companies’ shares listed on the Hong Kong stock market partly 
explains that drop in the overall market index. Yet, such a drop pales in comparison to the 33% 
drop in the overall Mainland share price index (World Bank, 2016b).26 The difference between 
Hong Kong and Mainland firms’ difference in share prices from the beginning of 2011 to the end 
of 2012 thus comes to around 31%. Such a difference comes from the company-specific and 
policy-specific differences between Hong Kong and Mainland firms. Mainland firms listing in 
Hong Kong thus saved 22% in losses – an effect we might call a Hong Kong listing effect. At 
that same time, Mainland firms experienced the changing corporate governance rules at a time 
when other companies around the world did not. These other companies share prices in the global 
S&P index fell by 15%. Thus, the specific effect of the corporate governance changes on 
Mainland firms – after removing market specific effects – comes to 7%. If the differences-in-
differences methodology removed other effects, revisions to Hong Kong’s code of corporate 
governance should have cased a 7% lift in Mainland share prices.  
 
Extending on this logic, we can derive the value of corporate governance reforms on Mainland 
companies’ market capitalisation. As we reported earlier, Mainland firms had a market 
capitalization of $8.2 trillion and better corporate governance has the potential to add another 7% 
in share value. We can not know the extent to which the Mainland government’s own efforts at 
corporate governance reform will increase share price valuations. If we assume that existing and 
planned corporate governance reform on the Mainland will translate into increases in market 
value of 3%, then the remaining 4% increase (times 8.2 trillion) equals roughly $330 billion. 
Thus, radical changes to Hong Kong’s corporate governance rules could increase market 
capitalizations on the Mainland by around $330 billion by the time their effects work through 
these companies.    
 
Changes to corporate governance rules would also affect these firms’ riskiness and the 
distribution of share price gains between Mainland firms. Figure 15 shows the spread in share 
prices for Hong Kong listed firms’ share prices in 2011 and in 2013. We have matched these 
                                                 
24 The HKICPA (2012) provides the background and content of that reform. As noted by the Hong Kong Exchange 
(2010), the Exchange started consultations on reforming the corporate governance code in 2010, with 
implementation carrying on in 2012. 
25 Such an increase occurred against the backdrop of a 5.4% drop in the S&P Global Market Index tracking Hong 
Kong (as reported by the World Bank, 2016).  
26 As we only want ball-park estimates for this paper, we do not disaggregate the Chinese markets into specific 
exchanges – like the Shanghai or Shenzhen exchanges.   
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price distributions to the closest fitting statistical distribution for these price changes (a log 
logistic curve). As shown, share prices between listed firms tightened after the code of corporate 
governance revisions. Such share price convergence should not surprise us -- as the expanded and 
standardized corporate governance regulations probably had the effect of reducing the variability 
of firm-specific differences in the governance practices which reflected on their share prices. 
Figure 16 though shows the dark side of such reforms. Compared with share price changes 
around the world, the share prices of many Mainland firms listed in Hong Kong dropped 
significantly. If we fit the tightest statistical distribution possible on the data, the resulting 
average price drop came out to around 20% more than world equity prices fell. Yet, when we 
take into account the larger share price gains of some companies (by fitting a normal distribution 
to the data), overall share prices rose by 7%. These data confirm a trend repeated by so many 
corporate governance researchers. Corporate governance reform may increase share price values 
in the longer-run, even if many companies lose in the short-run.27 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Claessens (2006) as well as Black and co-authors (2008) might explain such dynamics due to short-term resistance 
by the entrenched owners and managers whose interests corporate governance reform may threaten. Indeed, 
commentators like Crawford (2009) note that corporate governance reform’s whole purpose consists of getting 
managers to focus on the longer-term.  
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Naturally, any one using these simple estimates should use a bit of common sense. These results 
capture any Hong Kong-specific effect...not just the effect of its corporate governance and 
corporate governance rules. The size of equity available, slight differences in rules like shorting 
shares, and even cultural factors may account for some of this 7%. Yet, given investors’ ability to 
arbitrate these differences away – for example they can find deeper markets with similar shorting 
rules elsewhere in the world). We could have repeated this exercise with these companies listed 
in other jurisdictions as well (most of the literature we report on looks at US listings). Stripping 
out the effect of information flows, home market effects (market conditions in China), and 
regulation on these markets, the results would remain the same.28  
 
Conclusions 
 
We spent a long time looking at the fancier studies trying to figure out if corporate governance 
changes along the line of “the canon” results in higher shareholder returns. The canon represents 
the practices encouraged by the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and largely adopted 
(but not on a one-to-one or perfect basis) the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s Listing Rules. Once 
we remove the regressions and other theory-laden approaches, we find that a simple differences-
in-differences approach yields an estimated 7% gain in shareholder returns for Mainland 
companies adopting Hong Kong’s corporate governance practices (and other features unique to a 
Hong Kong listing). Using the simplest method available (simply calculating a 7% bump to all 
Mainland companies’ valuations), adopting the canon would generate $330 billion around 2016-
17.29 Looking at the way the way the distribution of shareholder returns differs before and after 
reform shows a proportion of firms’ shareholder value declining. Yet, the overall (average) 
increase more than offsets these losses – suggesting that the canon does not help all companies. 
Further research could usefully identify which companies such reform would hurt...and why.  
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